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Abstract
The complex nature of mental well-being is reflected in the great diversity of variables
thought to represent aspects of mental flourishing. Discovering the underlying structure of
mental well-being is important for a full understanding of this complex construct. Using data
from 3 countries (the United States, Japan, and Iran), we performed multi-dimensional scal-
ing to analyze the representation of 9 hedonic and eudaimonic well-being variables in a 2-
dimensional psychological space. The analyses revealed 2 interpretable underlying dimen-
sions across cultures and gender groups. The first dimension—eudaimonic well-being ver-
sus hedonic well-being—is well-known to well-being researchers. The second dimension—
existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence—has not been recognized before.
Existential relatedness is the characteristic of being meaningfully interconnected with things
other than oneself, and is mainly based on the variables positive relations with others, per-
sonal growth, purpose in life, and life satisfaction. Epicurean independence is the character-
istic of being relatively free of painful experiences and not feeling the need to have ones’
views accepted by anyone but oneself. Epicurean independence is mainly based on the var-
iables autonomy and absence of negative affect. We explain these dimensions in detail and
discuss the implications for well-being research and policy.
Introduction
Researchers have developed a large number of mental well-being variables. This rich diversity
of mental well-being variables is regarded as necessary and useful, reflecting the complex nature
of mental well-being itself [1]. However, psychological concepts tend to cluster together under
broader or higher-order constructs that should also be investigated for a complete understand-
ing of these variables. In other words, observing the relationships between these variables, and
the underlying patterns of the relationships, will enable researchers to better understand the
nature of mental well-being [2]. Hence, another important step in analyzing the concept of
well-being is to examine the underlying structure of mental well-being variables.
To understand the underlying structure of mental well-being variables, one strategy could
be to inspect their correlation matrixes. However, a relatively large number of variables seldom
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produce patterns of correlations that are clear and easy to discern from correlation matrices.
As Fabrigar and Wegener [3] point out, this makes it “difficult to gauge whether an observed
pattern of correlations is sufficiently close to a hypothesized pattern to support the appropri-
ateness of a particular structural representation of the data (e.g., all the measures assessing one
construct or a certain small set of constructs)” (p. 3). Consequently, researchers have turned to
factor analysis to identify the unobservable concepts (i.e., factors) that can account for the pat-
tern of correlations among mental well-being variables [4–7]. Factor analysis is a powerful
data reduction tool that provides useful information about the nature of the factors, the magni-
tude and direction of relationships between the factors, and the magnitude and direction of
the factors’ influences on observed variables (i.e., factor loadings). Such information offers
important contributions to our understanding of the nature of mental well-being.
Yet, factor analysis suffers from some inherent limitations. For example, in simple-structure
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) each mental well-being variable is allowed to load on
only a single latent factor, while its loadings on other latent variables are constrained to zero. It
is increasingly recognized that with real data, cross-loadings are far from rare [8]. Previous
research shows that, particularly in the measurement model of mental well-being, zero second-
ary loadings are rare [9]. Hence, constraining secondary loadings to zero may be unrealistic in
many circumstances, resulting in biased estimates [10]. Moreover, in CFA, the relationships
between an indicator and non-target factors, and the relationships between all of the indica-
tors, are usually fixed at zero, which means these relationships may go unnoticed. Many struc-
tural equation modelling computer tools output predicted correlations (and/or covariances)
between all variables of the model [11]. Yet, with a relatively large number of variables, the
resulting matrices are not much more useful than bivariate correlation matrices in discerning
underlying dimensions. Moreover, in practice, model-implied correlation matrices are rarely
independently explored in order to uncover underlying structures in CFA studies.
Classic Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) [3] and a more recent and powerful related tech-
nique called Exploratory Structural Equation Modelling (ESEM) [10] provide additional infor-
mation on the relationship between indicators and non-target factors by freely estimating all
of the non-target factor loadings [9, 12, 13, 14]. This allows for the relationship between each
variable and all of the factors to be determined, which is a clear advantage over CFA for these
exploratory techniques. However, in these techniques too, researchers usually do not probe all
pairwise relationships between all of the observed variables in pursuit of underlying dimen-
sions and patterns. This may be caused by the difficulties associated with discerning meaning-
ful patterns from the complex correlation matrices that these techniques produce.
Despite these limitations, factor analytic findings have provided undeniably important
insights into the structure of mental well-being variables, without which further progress
would not have been possible in this field of research. In particular, a general finding that
stands out from previous factor analytic studies is that mental well-being is a multi-dimen-
sional rather than a unidimensional construct [13]. The value of such robust findings is, for
example, to help protect the field against reductionist approaches that would reduce mental
well-being to a single dimension, resulting in the cost of losing valuable information about this
complex construct. In sum, factor analysis has certain strengths, and it has been tremendously
useful for the field of mental well-being, yet it can be supplemented by other exploratory data
reduction techniques that impose less constraints on the parameter estimates.
Unfortunately, researchers have largely ignored other techniques to systematically organize
and categorize mental well-being variables. In the present study, we used a statistical technique
called Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) on mental well-being data in order to identify the
underlying structure of mental well-being. Exploratory MDS is free from some of the statistical
constraints of factor analysis, allowing the data to more freely speak for themselves. MDS also
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enables simple and effective data visualization, which enables more holistic and intuitive eluci-
dation of the pairwise relationships between the variables and data’s underlying dimensions.
Therefore, we believe that MDS has much to offer to the field of mental well-being. Below, we
describe MDS and its potential for clarifying the structure of mental well-being variables in
more detail.
MDS and its merits
Large complex matrices of intercorrelations are often difficult to holistically explore and inter-
pret. MDS is a data reduction technique that provides a visual representation of the empirical
intercorrelations in order to facilitate the exploration and interpretation of the data. MDS out-
puts a spatial map conveying the relationships among variables, wherein similar variables are
placed closer and dissimilar variables are placed further apart from each other. Such maps
enable researchers to actually “see” the empirical data, potentially providing unique insights
into the otherwise complex matrix of associations among variables [15, 16]. The highly intui-
tive visual outputs of MDS are utilized to identify underlying dimensions that reflect the struc-
ture of complex psychological phenomena. These dimensions are straight lines (i.e., principal
axes) along which the variables are scattered in a typically 2-dimensional space. Dimensions
need to be interpreted by the researcher in correspondence with prior knowledge about the
variables. Interpretation is facilitated by identifying the variables located at the two ends of
each dimension [17].
Although MDS can be used in confirmatory ways, it is best used as an exploratory data
reduction technique, characterized by flexibility and relative freedom from strict theoretical
boundaries [17, 18]). Therefore, this technique is particularly helpful when the organization of
concepts and hidden structures are relatively unknown. In many fields of inquiry, existing the-
ory is “often insufficiently precise for [the purpose of] specifying hypotheses to the degree of
precision required by confirmatory analyses, hence the need for exploration” [19]. This partic-
ularly applies to the field of mental well-being, within which research on the dimensionality of
mental well-being has almost exclusively relied on factor analysis. The near total reliance on a
single data analytic technique when promising alternatives are available could lead to missing
psychologically meaningful dimensions along which mental well-being variables vary. As a
result, there may be hidden structures in mental well-being data awaiting discovery. In sum,
exploratory MDS can offer illuminating insights into the nature and structure of mental well-
being, while avoiding a priori theoretical commitments.
The present study
This study uses MDS to identify the dimensions along which nine important well-being vari-
ables vary within three cultures. The three cultures include the United States of America
(USA), Japan, and Iran, which differ in various cultural, religious, political, and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics. For example, Japan and the USA possess remarkably higher economic
development than Iran [20], Iran and Japan are less individualistic than the USA [21], and
Iran is remarkably higher in religiosity than the other two nations [22]. This cultural diversity
provides a favorable opportunity to examine the potential cultural similarities and differences
in any mental well-being dimensions emerging from MDS.
The mental well-being dimensions used in this study include positive affect, the absence of
negative affect, and life satisfaction. These three are the most commonly used variables to con-
ceptualize subjective/hedonic well-being [23]. What these three variables share is their emo-
tional and subjective nature as opposed to other more objective and functional mental well-
being variables. These variables generally measure how people feel and think about their lives.
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In factor analytic studies on mental well-being variables, these three variables tend to form a
separate latent factor [9].
Other included variables were the six elements of Ryff’s psychological well-being model
[24]: autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations, purpose in life,
and self-acceptance. These variables capture the points of convergence among the literatures
from developmental, clinical, existential, and personality psychology on the optimal function-
ing of humans [25]. The basic difference between psychological well-being and subjective well-
being is that psychological well-being predominantly captures various domains of functioning
rather than feeling. Ryff’s model of psychological well-being is recognized as the first, and one
of the most widely used, empirically based models of eudaimonic or functional well-being
[26]. In factor analytic studies of subjective and psychological well-being variables, the six psy-
chological variables tend to form a separate latent factor, with some cross-loadings [9].
Although not exhaustive, we believe that these nine subjective and psychological well-being
variables adequately represent much of the vast diversity in mental well-being variables as rec-
ognized by psychologists and philosophers. The nine variables have gained increasing popular-
ity in the social sciences, and have been extensively used to measure mental well-being across
cultures [26]. Using MDS as an exploratory analytical tool, the present study aimed at uncover-
ing hidden structures underlying this rather comprehensive array of mental well-being vari-
ables across three diverse cultural groups.
This study also sought to look at the gender differences in the facets and dimensions of
well-being. Not much is known about gender differences in the underlying structure of well-
being variables. Yet, a recent study by Joshanloo [27] using a short well-being scale in a large
sample from the USA provided some preliminary evidence in favor of gender similarity. The
study uncovered highly similar general structures for well-being across gender. Similarly, pre-
vious research using multiple-group CFA to examine the measurement invariance of well-
being scales shows that there are many more similarities between genders than differences in
the factor structures of well-being across cultures [28–30]. Research comparing the levels of
well-being dimensions across genders has also generally demonstrated small differences or the
absence of gender differences [31]. Given the findings demonstrating a large degree of gender
similarity in the levels and factor structure of well-being, we expected largely similar structures
to emerge across genders.
Methods
Participants
USA. This study used the data produced during 2004–2006 in the second wave of the
National Study of Midlife in the United States (MIDUS 2) [32]. The overall MIDUS 2 sample
consists of 4963 respondents. However, 922 participants had missing values on all nine vari-
ables of the study, and 53 participants had between 1 to 8 missing values. We only used 3988
participants (55.4% females) who had no missing data on the nine variables of the study (Mage
= 56.12, SDage = 12.34). More information about data collection procedures can be found at
http://midus.wisc.edu.
Japan. This study used the data produced during 2012 in the second wave of the Survey of
Midlife Development in Japan (MIDJA 2) [33]. The overall MIDJA 2 sample consists of 657
respondents. However, 22 participants had between 1 to 6 missing values. Our final sample
consisted of 634 participants (52.4% females) who had no missing data on the nine variables of
the study (Mage = 58.89, SDage = 13.41). The MIDJA measures parallel those in the MIDUS.
The scales of the study were translated into Japanese using the method of back-translation.
More information on the survey can be found at http://midus.wisc.edu/midja.
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Iran. We used a convenience sample of 527 university students studying at universities in
Tehran. However, we excluded 2 participants that had missing values on some of the nine vari-
ables, leaving a final sample of 525 (58.1% females, Mage = 21.70, SDage = 2.68). The study was
voluntary, anonymous, and in Persian. Informed consents were obtained from the partici-
pants. The scales of the study were translated into Persian using the method of back-
translation.
The American and Japanese data were collected in national projects and their methods and
procedures are described on the MIDUS/MIDJA website. Data collection in Iran was super-
vised by the first author in conformity with all international research and ethical standards.
However, IRB approval was not required for psychological surveys in the data collection sites
in Iran at the time of data collection. Inquiries concerning the Iranian dataset may be directed
to the first author. The Iranian data file is supplied as supporting information (S1 Dataset).
Measures
Affect. The 12-item negative and positive affect scale [34, 35] was used to measure positive
and negative affect in all three countries. Respondents indicate how often (from 1 = all to
5 = none of the time) during the past 30 days, they felt six positive and six negative affective
states. All the responses are recoded such that higher scores indicate higher frequency of the
experienced emotions. In all the analyses, negative affect was reverse-coded to represent the
absence of negative affect.
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed in the USA using the 5-item MIDUS life
satisfaction scale. The items measure satisfaction with overall life, work, health, relationship
with spouse/partner, and relationship with children. Each item is coded from the worst possible
(0) to the best possible (10). In Iran, the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) [36] was used to
measure life satisfaction. Each of the five items of this measure is rated on a 7-point scale rang-
ing from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). In Japan, both the MIDUS life satisfaction
scale and the SWLS were included. Therefore, two separate analyses were conducted for this
country, to examine the impact of scale use on the general structure of the variables.
Psychological well-being. In the USA and Japan, a 42-item version of Ryff’s psychological
well-being scales [24] was used to measure the six elements of psychological well-being. In
Iran, the 54-item version [24] of the scale was used. Items are scored on a 7-point scale ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Statistical analysis
MDS represents proximity data (e.g., measures of similarity/dissimilarity or correlation) as dis-
tances among points in a typically 2-dimensional space. Beginning with some starting configu-
ration, the scaling moves iteratively, so that the fit between distances and data is improved
until no further improvement seems possible in the resulting geometric space. The data in the
present study were analyzed by means of the MDS technique PROXSCAL [37] in SPSS 25.
PROXSCAL is recognized as one of the most technically up-to-date, and most widely used and
recommended MDS algorithms [15]. PROXSCAL offers several improvements over other scal-
ing algorithms (e.g., ALSCAL), including algorithmic strategies for ensuring better conver-
gence [38]. As is typical in modern applications of MDS, the analysis was based on Euclidean
distances and Z transformation initialized with the Torgerson solution [15, 39]. Given the
scales of the measured variables, an interval proximity transformation was used. We chose a
2-dimensional solution for the present data for several reasons: To achieve greater parsimony,
to increase the chances of the findings being replicated in future research, to increase the gen-
eralizability of the findings to other national samples, to facilitate more effective interpretation
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and communication of the results [15, 17], and because nine variables may be insufficient to
reliably infer more than two dimensions. Model-data fit was assessed in terms of Kruskal’s
Stress-1, with a value of 0 indicating a perfect MDS solution. Stress-1 values greater than .20
are considered to indicate unacceptable fit [40].
Results
The internal consistencies and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1. Fig
1 displays the 2-dimensional MDS plots for the three countries. The Stress-1 values were
smaller than the cutoff point of .20 in the USA (.11), Japan with the MIDUS life satisfaction
scale (.11), Japan with the SWLS (.13), and Iran (.14), indicating acceptable fit for the 2-dimen-
sional solution in all countries. The MDS solutions displayed in the plots are similar, with a
few minor differences. In particular, there is a high level of consistency with respect to the vari-
ables located at the opposite ends of each of the dimensions (which are usually afforded more
weight in dimension interpretation [17]). On the horizontal dimension in the present three
solutions, the three subjective well-being variables have clearly clustered on one side, and psy-
chological well-being variables have clustered on the other side. Thus we may infer a primary
dimension of eudaimonic well-being versus hedonic well-being. This result is in line with
Joshanloo’s MDS analysis of a short well-being scale, which found robust evidence of a
hedonic vs eudaimonic dimension [27].
Concerning the vertical dimension, inspection of the relative positions of the variables
across the 2-dimensional space indicates that purpose in life, personal growth, positive rela-
tions, and life satisfaction have clustered at one side, a region that can be titled “existential
relatedness”, given the existential and relational contents of these variables. Autonomy and
the absence of negative affect, on the other hand, have clustered at the opposite side of the
solutions, which may be collectively titled “Epicurean independence”. The primary motiva-
tion for this title is the view, initially articulated and popularized by Epicurus [41], that the
absence of negative emotions is the key to well-being. Although minor differences in the
placement of individual variables along this dimension are noticeable across the nations,
the general placement of the variables at the opposite ends of the dimension is quite consis-
tent. Hence, we may infer a second dimension of existential relatedness versus Epicurean
independence. These dimensions are thoroughly discussed in the next section. Fig 2 dis-
plays the MDS plots across gender and nation. Again, despite some minor differences, the
same two underlying dimensions can be clearly identified across gender groups in the three
nations. Thus, the two general dimensions seem to be applicable to the national and gender
subgroups.
Perhaps the only structurally important difference that emerged between the national MDS
solutions is the position of positive affect on the vertical dimension. In the USA and Iran, posi-
tive affect is closer to the Epicurean independence end of the dimension, whereas in the Japa-
nese solution, positive affect is closer to the existential relatedness end of the dimension. To
accommodate for this cultural difference, and to infer more universally applicable dimensions,
we did not weight positive affect in this dimension’s interpretation and labeling. However,
considering the highly consistent meta-structure emerging across the three countries, this lack
of correspondence in the location of a single variable does not seem to be highly consequential.
When comparing the MDS solutions across groups, the stability of the meta-structure of the
MDS solutions matters more than simple point-by-point correspondences [15], and in our
results the stability of the general structural configuration across the national and gender
groups is clear.
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Discussion
The purpose of using MDS in this study was to use the graphical outputs to identify underlying
dimensions and concepts in mental well-being data, including dimensions that may have been
overlooked by previous research. A specific advantage of MDS over the other approaches is
Table 1. Internal consistencies and correlations.
α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
USA
1.Positive affect .90 1.00
2.Negative affect (absence) .85 .61 1.00
3.Life satisfaction (MIDUS) .65 .56 .50 1.00
4.Autonomy .71 .30 .32 .23 1.00
5.Environmental mastery .78 .58 .58 .55 .52 1.00
6.Personal growth .75 .41 .38 .39 .43 .58 1.00
7.Positive relations .78 .46 .39 .45 .38 .62 .58 1.00
8.Purpose in life .70 .44 .44 .44 .40 .63 .69 .60 1.00
9.Self-acceptance .84 .60 .54 .56 .51 .76 .64 .66 .68
Japan
1.Positive affect .93 1.00
2.Negative affect (absence) .86 .46 1.00
3.Life satisfaction (MIDUS) .72 .61 .46 1.00
4.Autonomy .73 .23 .27 .24 1.00
5.Environmental mastery .75 .47 .48 .53 .54 1.00
6.Personal growth .80 .34 .32 .42 .41 .63 1.00
7.Positive relations .78 .43 .34 .44 .33 .61 .66 1.00
8.Purpose in life .58 .34 .25 .36 .32 .54 .66 .56 1.00
9.Self-acceptance .79 .52 .45 .54 .53 .72 .66 .63 .52
Japan
1.Positive affect .93 1.00
2.Negative affect (absence) .86 .46 1.00
3.Life satisfaction (SWLS) .90 .59 .33 1.00
4.Autonomy .73 .23 .27 .28 1.00
5.Environmental mastery .75 .47 .48 .50 .54 1.00
6.Personal growth .80 .34 .32 .38 .41 .63 1.00
7.Positive relations .78 .43 .34 .44 .33 .61 .66 1.00
8.Purpose in life .58 .34 .25 .32 .32 .54 .66 .56 1.00
9.Self-acceptance .79 .52 .45 .64 .53 .72 .66 .63 .52
Iran
1.Positive affect .88 1.00
2.Negative affect (absence) .82 .60 1.00
3.Life satisfaction (SWLS) .87 .50 .41 1.00
4.Autonomy .69 .21 .33 .22 1.00
5.Environmental mastery .73 .49 .51 .53 .46 1.00
6.Personal growth .70 .30 .37 .34 .38 .60 1.00
7.Positive relations .82 .41 .42 .41 .30 .58 .46 1.00
8.Purpose in life .74 .36 .48 .42 .39 .70 .71 .51 1.00
9.Self-acceptance .83 .56 .56 .63 .52 .73 .58 .57 .65
Note. All correlations coefficients were significant at p< .01. Alphas are from the MIDUS and MIDJA documentations of scales. SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214045.t001
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that its graphical outputs allow for one-to-many and many-to-many relationships among the
variables to be automatically and conveniently observed. In this way, MDS proved to be useful.
The graphical output demonstrated two dimensions: the well-known eudaimonic well-being
versus hedonic well-being dimension, and the existential relatedness versus Epicurean inde-
pendence dimension. Demonstrating the value of the graphical outputs, neither of these
Fig 1. Two-dimensional MDS plots across nations. Dimension 1: hedonic well-being vs eudaimonic well-being. Dimension 2: existential relatedness versus
Epicurean independence. Japan 1 = Japanese analysis using the MIDUS life satisfaction scale. Japan 2 = Japanese analysis with the SWLS.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214045.g001
Concept mapping of well-being variables
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Fig 2. Two-dimensional MDS plots across national and gender groups. Dimension 1: hedonic well-being vs
eudaimonic well-being. Dimension 2: existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence. Japan 1 = Japanese
analysis using the MIDUS life satisfaction scale. Japan 2 = Japanese analysis with the SWLS.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214045.g002
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dimensions are easily identifiable from the intercorrelation matrix shown in Table 1. In partic-
ular, the emergence of the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence dimension
from the data can be considered a unique contribution of the present analysis.
Dimension 1: The eudaimonic versus hedonic dimension
The eudaimonic well-being versus hedonic well-being dimension (Dimension 1) comes
through clearly in Figs 1 and 2. Aligning with previous research using a variety of methods [9,
27, 42, 43, 44], the study variables appeared to fall into two groups along the horizontal axis,
with Ryff’s eudaimonic variables predominantly in one group and the affect and satisfaction
variables, usually associated with hedonic well-being, in the other group.
The variables autonomy, personal growth, purpose in life, and to a lesser extent positive
relations with others, self-acceptance, and environmental mastery, constitute the eudaimonic
pole of Dimension 1. The clustering of these eudaimonic well-being variables on one side of
Dimension 1 suggests that judging oneself by one’s own standards, feelings of self-improve-
ment over time, having meaningful goals in life, and to a lesser extent enjoying good relation-
ships with others, accepting oneself, and being able to fruitfully use features of the external
world tend to co-vary together, and in ways that the hedonic well-being variables do not.
Eudaimonic well-being was originally an Aristotelian idea, and is best captured by the notion
that what makes our lives go well for us is the exercise of excellent character traits [45]. Aris-
totle himself explained his eudaimonic account of well-being by contrasting it to hedonic
accounts of well-being. Rather than viewing the good life as a continuous state of mind, such
as constantly feeling pleasure, Aristotle argued that achieving the good life is an active pro-
cess–actually doing things, not just feeling things [45]. An appropriate translation for eudai-
monia is “flourishing”, which captures Aristotle’s concept of well-being because his
philosophy was grounded in naturalism, and his view of the good life was wanting for nothing
because you were all you could be given your natural kind [45–49]. As such, understanding
eudaimonia as it was originally intended, and not as the more hedonically flavored “happi-
ness”, as it is sometimes translated as, helps support the labeling of eudaimonic well-being and
hedonic well-being on opposite ends of the spectrum that is Dimension 1.
The hedonic well-being pole of Dimension 1 constitutes positive affect, the absence of nega-
tive affect, and life satisfaction. In other words, feeling good, not feeling bad, and being satis-
fied with life tend to co-vary with each other, and not necessarily or nearly as closely with the
eudaimonic well-being variables. There is already a great deal of empirical evidence supporting
the close relationship between these hedonic well-being variables [9]. And, although it is now
understood that there are empirical and conceptual differences between these hedonic well-
being variables [50], many philosophers of the past saw them as either intimately related or
simply identical in all but name[51]. Notably, the most famous proponent of hedonism, [52],
argued that pleasure and satisfaction (along with many cognate terms) were all names for the
underlying concept of positive experience. So for Bentham, and many other philosophers from
his era, being happy was feeling good, which either meant or entailed also not feeling bad and
being satisfied.
Of interest to cross-cultural psychologists, the visual output in Fig 1 shows that the three
hedonic well-being variables group together at about the same distance from the eudaimonic
variables in all of the countries, despite the considerable cultural differences between the sam-
ples. Cross-cultural research on hedonic well-being has demonstrated cultural differences in
the extent to which positive and negative affect co-vary with life satisfaction [50, 53]. Despite
likely cultural differences in the relationships between the hedonic well-being variables, they
group in a very similar way when viewed on the eudaimonic well-being versus hedonic well-
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being dimension. This suggests two things for the three cultures included in this study. First,
that the underlying eudaimonic-hedonic well-being dimension is cross-culturally robust. And
second, that any differences in the relationships between the hedonic well-being variables
across cultures pales in comparison to the difference between eudaimonic and hedonic
variables.
A striking feature of the eudaimonic well-being versus hedonic well-being dimension is
that it can be observed in every panel of the figures; it appears in the data for all three cultures
and in both male and female subgroups for each culture. So, despite the deep cultural differ-
ences between the highly religious Iranian sample, the wealthy and collectivist Japanese sam-
ple, and the wealthy and individualistic sample from the United States [20–22], the data
support the existence of a robust eudaimonic well-being versus hedonic well-being dimension.
Despite aligning with the vast majority of research that supports the eudaimonic well-being
versus hedonic well-being distinction, finding this distinction using MDS is an important
advance in happiness studies. Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, and King [54] started a major debate
by arguing that distinguishing between eudaimonic and hedonic well-being has its disadvan-
tages, and is not necessarily supported by existing studies. Kashdan and colleagues [54] point
out that the empirical “research suggesting that SWB and eudaimonia are independent factors
stems from three data sources: factor analytic studies, dependent correlations between nar-
row-band indicators or each type of well-being with a common outcome variable, and person-
centered studies comparing different groups of people” (pp. 224–225). But our MDS study
provides a new kind of support for distinguishing between eudaimonic and hedonic well-
being.
Dimension 2: The existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence
dimension
Like Dimension 1, the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence dimension
(Dimension 2; the vertical dimension) comes through clearly in Figs 1 and 2. Quite unlike
Dimension 1, Dimension 2 is a novel discovery in well-being research. Existential relatedness
is an existing concept in well-being studies [55], but Epicurean independence is novel, as is the
emergence of a dimension of well-being with existential relatedness at one end and Epicurean
independence at the other. While the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence
dimension is original, it is not completely unexpected. Notions highly similar to both of these
concepts were recently found to be highly salient in lay definitions of happiness in a study of
12 nations [56].
The variables positive relations with others, personal growth, purpose in life, and life satis-
faction constitute the existential relatedness pole of Dimension 2. Based on Friedrich Schleier-
macher’s notion of ‘ein unmittelbares existentialverhältnis’ [57], existential relatedness is the
characteristic of being meaningfully interconnected with things other than oneself. This mean-
ingful interconnectedness can include both spiritual and secular aspects, such as a profound
connection with God, nature, or a group of people. Citing [58], Ai and colleagues [55] describe
existential relatedness as a higher-order intrapersonal relatedness; “a deep feeling of connec-
tions with divine, humanity, the world, and the universe, each viewed as a whole” (p. 370). Sep-
arate bodies of literature describe concepts related to self-transcendence in a similar way [59,
60, 61].
The clustering of the existential relatedness variables on one side of Dimension 2 suggests
that having deep connections with others, feelings of personal growth over time, having a
meaningful purpose in life, and being satisfied with life tend to co-vary together, and in ways
that the Epicurean independence variables do not. The covariance of these variables fits well
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with what is known about existential relatedness. For example, existential relatedness, be it
from recognition of religious or secular interconnectedness, tends to promote “profound spiri-
tual feelings [that] can permeate one’s entire life, operating as a powerful affective stimulus
toward human existence and growth” (p. 370) [55], and brings many opportunities for feelings
of meaning and purpose in life [62].
Existential relatedness is not the same concept as positive relations with others [55], but the
connection between them is strong. A profound sense of one’s deep interconnectivity with
people and things outside of oneself tends to encourage recognition of the value of other peo-
ple and, thereby, regular tending to relationships. And, of course, well-tended relationships are
more likely to be positive relationships. A strong sense of interconnectivity and the value of
people and things outside of oneself might also lead one to be more satisfied with life, perhaps
especially using a domain-based measure of life satisfaction as we do here. Reminiscent of
Buddhist teachings, appreciating the interconnectivity and value of all things might lead to a
reduction in the sense of being in competition with others, and feeling dissatisfied because of
not having as many of the accoutrements of modern commercial life as one’s neighbors. This
may explain why Mikulincer and Florian [63] found existential relatedness to be a resilience
factor throughout the lifespan.
At the other end of Dimension 2, lies the Epicurean independence pole, which is consti-
tuted by autonomy and absence of negative affect. Named for Epicurus of Samos (c.341–271
BCE), Epicurean independence is achieved by being relatively free of painful experiences and
not feeling the need to have ones’ views accepted by anyone but oneself. Being self-determin-
ing and independent in a way that enables one to resist social pressures to think and act in cer-
tain ways and to regulate one’s own behavior from within tends to be facilitated by a kind of
self-directed detachment from everything. Epicurus (aligned with the Stoics on this issue)
would point out that if one puts little to no emphasis on things outside of one’s control, then
one is much less likely to be hurt by them [41]. For example, if one were to strongly desire to
be liked by others, then one’s well-being is to a greater extent at the mercy of other people,
decreasing one’s control over one’s own well-being, and increasing the chance of suffering. In
this way, the detachment from things outside of oneself acts as a kind of shield against the
vicissitudes of life, a buffer against the worst and most common kinds of suffering. As a result,
independence and absence of negative affect can rise and fall together.
Epicurus advised others to seek a certain degree of independence from society, culture, tra-
dition, and contemporary religious views. For example, contrary to the dominant beliefs at the
time, Epicurus advised others to stop living in fear of, and attempting to appease, the Gods
because they were very unlikely to be interested in what a mere mortal was up to [41]. Epicurus
advocated for independence and mental and emotional self-reliance for the purpose of avoid-
ing suffering. Indeed, avoiding suffering was the most important endeavor for Epicurus [64].
Epicurus viewed the absence of suffering (especially psychological pains, i.e., negative affect) as
the ideal state, often referring to it as pleasure [65]. So, Epicurus would praise Epicurean inde-
pendence, greatly appreciating the coincidence of self-reliance, free-thinking, and the absence
of negative affect.
Considering the opposing poles together helps to further clarify the structure of Dimension
2. Understood in opposition to existential relatedness, Epicurean independence involves
diminishing the significance of one’s interrelations with other people and things, especially
any bonds of dependence. Ai and colleagues [55] have argued that existential relatedness
involves more than just wanting to be cared for by other people, it extends to one’s desires to
care for others as well, since this fully realizes the back-and-forth of true interrelationships and
makes oneself an important part of the whole. In contrast, Epicurean independence involves
mental self-sufficiency, a kind of self-directed detachment from everything, a stance that
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eschews the bonds of dependence as much as possible. Epicurus would admonish anyone that
allowed their desires to reach out beyond their personal sphere of control, since this puts the indi-
vidual at risk of suffering disappointment [65]. To a certain extent then, existential relatedness
involves seeing oneself as a part of a whole with other people and other things, caring deeply for
them, and perhaps even being vulnerable to them, in a way that Epicurean independence does
not. In this way, existential relatedness encourages deep bonds, and Epicurean independence
encourages control and power. The deep bonds of existential relatedness can result in great suf-
fering. In times of injustice, or when a beloved community turns its back, one suffers more
anguish as one is more attached to the relevant relationships. So it seems that, as a result of the
suffering that results from deep caring for other people and things, existential relatedness doesn’t
co-vary with absence of negative affect nearly as strongly as Epicurean independence does.
There is another potential reason for why existential relatedness doesn’t co-vary with
absence of negative affect nearly as strongly as Epicurean independence; while Epicurus
thought pain to be the greatest evil [65], many existential thinkers view the whole range of
human experience, including negative emotions, to be integral to a meaningful human life
[62]. So, belief in the interconnectedness of everything in relation to meaning in life might
make the embracing of the whole range of emotions more likely. This stands in contrast to
belief in the notion that negative emotions can and should be minimized at all costs, which
probably leads to experiencing less negative affect.
Expanding and supplementing factor analytic findings
The variables of the present study have typically formed two separate yet related factors in pre-
vious exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic studies: hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being [9, 66, 67]. The present MDS results converge with the factor analytic results in showing
that the hedonic and eudaimonic variables occupied two separate regions of the plots. There-
fore, both factor analysis and MDS confirm the empirical distinction between hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being. However, MDS provides additional insights that can supplement the
factor analytic findings. Most importantly, by identifying a second dimension, MDS provides
a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the underlying variable structure and pairwise
relationships. Some of these novel insights are highlighted below.
Identifying the second dimension (i.e., existential relatedness versus Epicurean indepen-
dence) is itself an important addition to the study of mental well-being. Yet, it also promotes a
richer understanding of the first dimension. For example, although negative affect, a hedonic
variable, can be distinguished from the eudaimonic variable autonomy, the two variables
group together to form a concept that we labeled Epicurean independence. As such, both
hedonic and eudaimonic variables can be further described based on their proximity to the
poles of the second dimension. Therefore, identifying the second dimension helps in describ-
ing heterogeneity in the variables that define the first dimension. Similarly, identifying the first
dimension helps in describing heterogeneity in the variables that define the second dimension.
As expected, in addition to uncovering the major dimensions in the data, and the position
of every individual variable in each dimension, the MDS mapping of the data provides infor-
mation on the one-by-one relationships between all variables under study in a way that is
more intuitive than that provided by correlation matrices. Focusing on the national MDS plots
in Fig 1, for example, it is clear that autonomy and life satisfaction are relatively far apart from
each other across the MDS solutions, indicating a relatively weak association. The same goes
for autonomy and positive relations. In contrast, personal growth and purpose in life are rela-
tively close to each other. Self-acceptance and environmental mastery are even more closely
related.
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The MDS mapping of the data also allows for easy recognition of one-to-many relationships
between the variables. For example, among the nine variables, autonomy is farthest apart from
the rest of the variables, reflecting the weakest association with other variables. In contrast,
environmental mastery and self-acceptance both lie somewhere in the central regions of the
point configurations, reflecting that they demonstrate more or less equal correlations with all
of the other variables. Due to their central position in the planes, they can be seen as central
components of mental well-being, on both of the dimensions. However, given their distance
from the dimension ends, they play a relatively reduced role in the interpretation of the dimen-
sions. In all of the MDS plots presented, autonomy is the most isolated variable. This means
that, in the context of the nine variables under study, autonomy is the least related to the oth-
ers. As is often the case with isolated variables, autonomy also tends to fall a long way from the
center of the variables. Autonomy’s position on the periphery of the MDS plots suggests that it
is not as central to mental well-being as the other variables.
The present MDS results also permit the examination of cross-cultural differences in the
structure of well-being. The results for Dimension 2 are fairly robust, again occurring in all of
the national and gender groups in the study. The ubiquity of the result in our samples, and the
great diversity of our samples, especially in terms of religiosity and individuality, gives reason
to think that the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence dimension is a broadly
cross-cultural feature of well-being. Nevertheless, one variable, positive affect, occupies differ-
ent places on Dimension 2 in the groups under study. In the national samples, positive affect
falls within the existential connectedness cluster in the Japanese data, but closer to the Epicu-
rean independence cluster in the data for the United States and Iran. Analysis of the MDS
plots for the nation-gender subsamples, reveals that positive affect falls within the existential
connectedness cluster in the data for Iranian males and for Japanese males and females. These
results suggest that in collectivistic cultures such as Iran and Japan, positive affect is more likely
to be aligned with positive relational experiences, whereas in individualistic cultures, positive
affect is more likely to co-occur with the experience of autonomy.
This finding is in keeping with prior findings from cultural psychology. According to
Kitayama, Duffy, and Uchida [68], in individualistic cultures, “happiness is typically construed
as a personal achievement. Thus, individuals strive to attain happiness and, once obtained,
happiness affirms the worth of the internal, private self. In contrast, . . . happiness in Japan is
more socially anchored. It is seen as a realization of social harmony or state of mutual sympa-
thy and understanding.” (p. 150). Therefore, self-attribution of positive/happy feelings is more
likely to co-occur with autonomy and independence in individualistic cultures. In contrast, in
collectivistic cultures where interpersonal harmony and adjustment of oneself to fit the group
are emphasized, positive affect is more likely to be aligned with harmony with others and pos-
sibly the whole cosmos [61, 68]. The literatures on aversion to happiness [69] and ideal affect
[70] also suggest that high arousal emotions (e.g., joy and excitement) are more strongly valued
in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures. One of the reasons for this is that high
arousal emotions are perceived in collectivistic cultures as potential disrupters of interpersonal
harmony [69, 71]. Therefore, this finding is consistent with the previous evidence about the
cultural differences in the role and position of positive affect across cultures. Such novel
insights confirm the great potential of MDS as a supplementary method in the study of mental
well-being.
Concluding remarks, implications, and limitations
Using a novel method, this study discovered a 2-dimensional structure in nine important men-
tal well-being variables. Although the field of well-being has largely focused on the hedonic-
Concept mapping of well-being variables
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214045 March 27, 2019 14 / 20
eudaimonic dimension when describing the structure of mental well-being, as Belzak and col-
leagues [59] emphasize, the hedonic-eudaimonic dimension does not fully capture all existing
variation in well-being concepts. The exploratory MDS analysis conducted in the present
study revealed a second dimension (existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence) in
the underlying structure of well-being variables. Our second dimension corresponds with Bel-
zak and colleagues’ suggestion about the ignored dimension. They argue for self-transcen-
dence to be seen as an important component of well-being alongside the well-established
eudaimonic and hedonic components. Self-transcendence is defined as when “human agency
is enhanced through the epistemic revelation or illumination that occurs in transaction with
agencies, influences, and traditions beyond (antecedent to, greater than) the conscious self”
(p. 134) [59]. This understanding of self-transcendence is closely related to the concept of exis-
tential relatedness that emerged in the present study.
Our second dimension also resonates with the emphasis on the distinction between per-
sonal vs social or agency vs communion constructs in psychology [27, 72, 73]. Notably, an
exploratory MDS on a short well-being scale using an American sample also yielded a social
vs. personal dimension [27]. Therefore, the present and previous results collectively imply the
necessity of a second dimension to supplement the hedonic-eudaimonic dimension and cap-
ture the degree to which well-being variables are personal or social. Without a second dimeson
being recognized, the complete relational system formed by well-being variables is not fully
understandable. As noted before, a more nuanced understanding of the hedonic-eudaimonic
dimension can also result from considering an extra dimension. At any rate, these results illus-
trate the value of exploratory methods such as MDS in discovering structures and dimensions
in empirical data, and thereby supplementing factor analytic findings.
In line with the expectations of exploratory research, we clarified our findings by embedding
them in relevant literatures. Now that we have clarified the eudaimonic well-being versus
hedonic well-being, and the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence dimensions
of mental well-being, this novel structure can be tested and used in further well-being research.
This further research could investigate the extent to which this new model elucidates new under-
standings of the rich construct of mental well-being, in much the same way that the development
of the Big Five personality traits enabled a host of fruitful research on personality and personal-
ity’s role in other domains of interest [74, 75]. For example, the 2-dimensional structure could
have important ramifications for therapy. People high in Epicurean independence and low in
eudaimonic well-being might respond very differently to interventions focused on social-
embeddedness than someone high in existential relatedness and low in hedonic well-being.
Our findings also have important implications for interdisciplinary well-being research,
and the well-being approach to public policymaking. Economists researching well-being, have
tended to use a very limited range of mental well-being variables, often just one item on life
satisfaction. And, as can be seen in the makeup of the 2008 Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission,
economists seem to have had a much greater impact on public policy than other well-being
researchers. More recently, psychologists and some economists and policymakers have argued
for a broader range of mental well-being measures [76–78]. These broader ranges of mental
well-being questions tend to focus on ensuring a reasonable coverage of hedonic and eudaimo-
nic well-being questions. A goal of many of these researchers is to have mental well-being
questions added to national censuses. Unfortunately, a census is such a huge undertaking that
national statistical offices try to keep the number of questions strictly limited. As a result of
these limits, there may only be space for a few mental well-being questions. If that is the case,
then it may be better to ask questions that enable both of the dimensions of mental well-being
that we have discovered here to be assessed. For example, a question about autonomy, which
feeds into two dimensions and doesn’t co-vary closely with other variables, may be more
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important than a question about self-acceptance, which co-varies very closely with environ-
mental mastery.
A specific application of the 2-dimensional model of mental well-being to public policy
could help with the fraught issue of accounting for religious, secular, and hard-to-classify
aspects of higher purpose in life. If the public request that policymakers measure the important
aspects of mental well-being, then a model that includes existential relatedness might help
catch the people falling between traditional religious and secular views, like those with “new
age” beliefs that now make up fairly large proportions of the citizenry in various locations [79].
This novel 2-dimensional structure of mental well-being might also have important impli-
cations for cross-cultural well-being research, although our findings were robust across three
distinct cultures, and across alternate measures of our variables, future research should attempt
to replicate the 2-dimensional structure of mental well-being with other methods and in other
cultures. Further cross-cultural validation of this structure may result in a measurable concep-
tion of mental well-being that is more cross-culturally robust than existing models. For exam-
ple, the existential relatedness pole of Dimension 2 might better capture the cross-cultural
range of spiritual, secular, and religious aspects of higher meaning than other models.
A potential limitation of the study is that the Iranian sample is a convenience sample of uni-
versity students, whereas the other samples are of middle-aged people. It is possible that an
MDS analysis of middle-aged Iranians would have generated outputs with distinct dimensions.
This would mean that young Iranian adults seem to share a 2-dimensional structure of mental
well-being with middle-aged Japanese and middle-aged respondents from the USA, but the
same is not true of middle-aged Iranians. A follow-up study comparing young with middle-
aged and possibly older respondents within and across cultures would help resolve this issue
and could produce valuable findings in its own right.
Another potential limitation of any MDS analysis (indeed, many kinds of statistical analysis)
is that the resulting dimensions reflect the choice of input variables. There exist very many mea-
sures of mental well-being, and selecting different variables would likely have resulted in differ-
ent dimensions. For this reason, we chose variables that feature strongly in a wide variety of
work on mental well-being, for which cross-cultural data are readily available, and that cover
the main theories of mental well-being in philosophy, psychology, and economics. Given the
identification of the existential relatedness versus Epicurean independence dimension was post
hoc, future MDS research on mental well-being might test the robustness of this dimension by
including new variables that fit the conceptual descriptions of these new poles. Most important
in this regard would be to include variables aligned with the concepts of elevated experience or
self-transcendence, such as inspiration and awe [59, 60]. The investigation of well-being (more
generally) could also be advanced by running a similar MDS analysis that also includes social
variables, such as social integration, social contribution, and generalized trust.
Future research should also consider using alternative scales of the variables that we used
here. Our results from the Japanese sample demonstrate very little difference between the
MIDUS life satisfaction scale and Diener and colleague’s Satisfaction With Life Scale [36]. A
standout case for this kind of investigation is autonomy, which is conceptualized in self-deter-
mination theory [80] slightly differently from Ryff’s conceptualization [24]. Thus, it is impor-
tant for future research to replicate the present results with alternative scales of the variables
developed within various theoretical orientations.
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